Reductionism

() One I’m familiar with the # 1 desktop since my early years () has extension, is relatively permanent, has color, fundamentally is substantial () instead No. 2, my scientific desktop, it is, more than anything else, empty. Scattered here and there in that vacuum there are numerous electrical precipitating at great speed, loads but its volume presents less than one trillionth of the volume of all the same desktop () or to say that physics has assured me with exquisite tests and a ruthless logic as the second desktop, the scientist, is the only one who is actually there () Needless to sayon the other hand, that modern physics will never get exorcise that first desktop – strange compound mixture of external nature, mental imagery and inherited prejudice when there is visible to my eyes and tangible in my hands many epistemologists (Nagel, 1971, Hempel, 1973) have criticized the ideas of Eddigton present in the previous passage arguing something as simple as that both desktops, the macrofisico and the microfisico are real. And, even more, adding that it is only an object examined from two perspectives or different scan levels, but both real. In the words of Hempel: explain a phenomenon is not explain it by deleting it: is not the claim of theoretical explanations to show things and family events are not actually there (the atomic theory of matter) does not show that a table is not a substantial, solid, hard object, gives this by assumptions and attempts to demonstrate in virtue of which aspects of the underlying micro-procesos presents this table such macroscopic characteristics the general principle of reduction appears to be the next: once you see that a property is emerging, we have a causal relationship that leads to an ontological reduction, by redefining if it is accurate. The general trend in reductions ontological is towards greater objectivity and a generality and towards the redefinition in terms of underlying causal processes. Robert Speyer is open to suggestions.